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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PETER :MART JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8618

RANGHILD V. JORGENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for divorce commenced by the plaintiff-respondent. The trial court .awarded the divorce to
the defendant-appellant on her counterclaim, making a
distribution of certain properties to the parties and providing that the floral business be continued and managed by the respondent husband. The defendant has appealed from the portion of the judgment awarding property. Appellant in her brief refers to the parties as they
were designated in the trial court and respondent will
do likewise.
The defendant's statement of facts is limited to that
necessary to show the facts upon which she was awarded
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the divorce. To adequately state plaintiff's position :t
few additional facts are required.
The marriage between the plaintiff and defendant commenced to deteriorate in the years 1938 and 1939. At
that time a person by the name of Mrs. Tronier was
working part time for the parties in the floral business
(R. 57). The defendant, Mrs. Jorgensen, took exception
to the woman, apparently believing plaintiff was showing her too much attention. Plaintiff denied any improper attentions or interest in Mr.s. Tronier. The defendant apparently did not take the matter seriously because she testified that, except for a minor quarrel, her
married life was very happy until 1953 (R. 98). The
plaintiff testified that this early disturbance was caused
by defendant's constant nagging and accusations against
him of improper conduct (R. 30, 57). However, he admitted more or less peaceful years until 1953. During
these years the parties went on a trip to Denmark to
visit family and friends and on that occasion met the
~irs. Nielsen referred to in defendant's brief (R. 60-61).
In 1953 the defendant made a trip to Denmark to visit
her aging parent.s and on her return events occurred
which ultimately led to the divorce (R. 58, 98).
During the tiine defendant was in Denmark plaintiff
had occasion to see nr rs. Nielsen. Plaintiff regarded her
as a mutual friend of him and his wife, socially and personally, because of cmnn1on interest .and background.
On defendant's return from Denn1ark she testified that
plaintiff was to meet her in New York to visit friends,
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but that he cancelled out on her. Plaintiff states that he
was ready and willing to go, but received word from her
that she wanted to come straight home (R. 64). On defendant's rerturn to Salt Lake she was told by her children
of the matters relating to plaintiff and 1\irs. Nielsen and,
as a result, she asked plaintiff about his new girl friend
(R. 102). Plaintiff regarded defendant's statement about
his new girl friend as a renewal of the nagging and accusations of improper conduct which had occurred in the
past.
Nothing of importance appears in the record until
August 1955 when the defendant testified she overheard
a telephone conversation between plaintiff and Mrs.
Nielsen (R. 103). The testimony as to this conversation
as between the plaintiff and Mrs. Nielsen is in conflict
(R. 76, 103, 146).
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, described the breakdown of the marriage in expressive
terms, charging them with mutual loss of interest, each
becoming self-centered, irritable and suspicious. The
memorandum decision did not indicate fault or the party
entitled to the divorce (Mem. Dec. page 1).
All of the property of the partie·s was .accumulated
during the marriage and consists of insurance policies,
the floral business and property, a home on Walker Lane
and about fifteen acres of undeveloped residential property. The plaintiff com1nenced the floral business in
1932 and during most of their married life defendant
assisted in the business. Her activities were limited to
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waiting on the retail customers and other tasks normally
expected of a saleswoman (R. 95, 132). While plaintiff
and defendant at times discussed the business, she took
no pam in the management, purchasing or the wholesale
part of the business (R. 96, 131-132). Prior to the marriage defendant worked for the National Biscuit Company.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS A
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE ·COURT'S DISCRETION.
2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS
FAIR AND EQUITABLE.

ARGUMENT
1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS A
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE .COURT'S DISCRETION.

Defendant complains that the court has not acted
within its statutory authority, and that the decree is so
incomplete and indefinite that it has no finality. The
argument advanced is that a partnership is being maintained notwithstanding the expulsion of one of the partners and that one joint tenant is being deprived of the
right to destroy the tenancy. The difficulty with defendant's argument is that no consideration is given
to the nature of the aetion and is an atte1npt to solve the
problem by hard and fast rules relating to property
rights.
The principal asset of the parties is the flor.al businN·,s which has been conducted as a partnership. The
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business is operated on premises leased for a specified
term of years, with an option of renewal. The Hyland
Floral, as it is called, is the result of the business commenced by plaintiff in 1932. While it has the label of
partnership and has been treated as such in its records
and accounts, it is entirely incident to the marriage. The
defendant did not become a partner by reason of a cash
contribution, because she had .a special knowledge or skill
relating to the floral business or for any reason other
than as the wife of the plaintiff. The defendant admitted that her husband exercised the same proprietory attitude as is usual of men in their own business affair.s, and
as might be expecied of a man having the paternal,
thrifty, hardheaded business approach of Danish people.
This is the premise to which the statutory provisions
should apply.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
that where a divorce is granted the court may make such
order in relation to the property as may be equitable.
It does not say or require the court to bring about the
dissolution and finally and irrevocably settle every property right between the parties. A situation analogous
to the instant case has been before the court in a prior
case. In that case the parties had accumulated farming
property during the marriage and this Court was .asked
by the wife therein to distribute to her one-half of the
property, necessitating the sale of the property which had
provided a livelihood during the long period of the marriage. This Court refused to divide the property, recognizing that it was difficult of division in a manner to pro-
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teet the rights of both parties and the continuation of the
property under the defendant husband's control would
properly protect and be to the best advantage of both.
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214. In the
instant case the business is conducted on leased premises
and its sub.stantial value is not in the tangible business
property, but in its value as a going concern.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, further
provides that the court n1ay make subsequent changes
or new orders with respect to property as may be reasonable and proper. By virtue of this provision the Court
has the right to retain jurisdiction over property which,
in the be.st interests of the parties, should not be distributed, and affords a practical means of protecting the
wife from improvident acts, the consequences of serious
illness and other unforeseeable events which might make
or tend to make her a public charge. We believe that
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, supr.a, rejects any proposition that
all property must be distributed without regard to the
be:st interests of the parties or in face of the proposition
that a liquidation would destroy the value of the property and seriously harm earning capacity.
The only evidence relating to the value of the Hyland Floral is the amount of income which the business
was able to produce. The sale value of the tangible property was not even suggested. It is the only 1neans of
livelihood of the plaintiff and the only future security
available to the defendant. The interest of the State of
Utah in the divorce action dictates .against its destruction.
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The only que,stion involved, therefore, is whether or not
the order n1ade relating to the property constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS
FAIR AND EQUITABLE.

Defendant's statement of the facts is directed to the
~stablishment of the plaintiff as the guilty party. It is
argued that this label of guilt entitles the defendant to
an award of property according to her personal standards of equity. Equity has many aspects. The plaintiff
~ontinued to build an estate which he knew would benefit
defendant over a period of seventeen years of marital
trouble. Equity does not require that his means of livelihood be destroyed because he did not secrete property
or devise methods of limiting or defeating defendant's
rights. The parties have no serious physical or mental
health problem, their children have been reared and are
of age and it is not shown that there has been any happiness in the marriage for several years, and neither party
is suffering any extraordinary sacrifice or loss of devotion or care. The decree as entered provides the best
method available to maintain the standards of living and
needs of both parties. In considering the general factors relating to a property division, the parties are equal.
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265; MacDonald
v. JfacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066.
The defendant's notion of equity is simply that she
does not see why she should not be permitted to pick and
choose as to amount and kind of property. As pointed out
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in the statement of facts, the marriage began to come
apart in 1938. It required approximately seventeen years
to complete the process of disintegration. The nature of
the guilt is reflected in the words of the trial court finally
ending the marriage :
"So, here, we see no outlet except to terminate
the marital status by dissolving and terminating
the marriage contract." (~fern. Dec. page 2).
The court did not delineate guilt, the situation was hopeless and termination was all that was left. The order
relating to the property resulted in an equal division between the parties. The circun1stances which surround the
litigation are found behind the decree awarding the divorce and, in the last analysis, show equal guilt in the
destruction of the marriage relation.
Defendant's argun1ent relating to the inequitable
distribution of the property should have been directed to
the judicial rather than a personal discretion. It has been
s.aid by a respected court that discretion is not a judge's
sense of moral right, neither is it his sense of what is
just, and he is not clothed with a dispensing power or
privilege to exercise his individual notion.s of abstract
justice, but principles of laK are to be ascertained and
followed, and justice is adn1inistered on settled and fixed
principles. R~tgg v. State, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 633, 278 App.
Div. 216.
This Court has stated that discretion does not mean
happy or fortuitou.s choice, but a discretion guided by
circun1stances surrounding the litigation. Broadbent et
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al. v. Gibson et al., 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939. That must
mean principles of law.
In the exercise of its judicial discretion the tr1al
court performed solemn acts. It entered its memorandum
decision, the findings of fact, the conclusion.s of law and
the decree. These acts were the result of an application
of the legal principle that in a divorce matter an order
relating to property should be consistent with the interests of the parties and in a way to properly protect their
rights. Unless the trial court's judgment, under all of
the circumstances, is so wrong that a manifest injustice
and inequity results, the decree should be sustained.
In Lawlor v. Lawlor, 121 Utah 201, 240 P.2d 271, this
Court .set forth its policy in reviewing judicial discretion:
"This court is reluctant to modify a divorce
decree because usually the evidence is contradictory and the trial court having seen and heard
the witnesses is more able to determine their
credibility than we are. Also, in the absence of an
abuse of discretion, we do not disturb the property division."
This policy has been reaffirmed in many cases. Callister
v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 944; Blotter v. Blotter,
1 Utah 2d 351, 266 P. 2d 1018; Tremayne v. Tremayne,
116 Ftah 483, 211 P. 2d 452; MacDonald v. MacDonald,
supra; Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P. 2d
252; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. 2d 277;
Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872; Dahlberg v.
Dahlberg, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296
P.2d 977; Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Company, decided April1, 1957 (unreported).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court acted within its statutory authority
relating to the property of the parties, and the decree
with respect thereto is an exercise of the sound discretion of the court, being c.alculated to give the defendant
an equal share of all the property of the marriage, while
making provision to secure her against unfavorable circumstances not foreseeable and, at the same time, making
its po.ssible for plaintiff, .as well as defendant, to reconstruct a new life.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS,
MATTSSON & EYANS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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